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tax notes
FLP in the Black
By Wendy C. Gerzog
Wendy C. Gerzog is a professor at the University of
Baltimore School of Law.

sell. Those concerns stemmed from his son’s potential
default on a personal bank loan collateralized with Erie
stock, the son’s marital problems, which ended in divorce, and pressures on the son to rescue his in-laws from
bankruptcy. Mr. Black also worried that his two grandsons, who were unemployed, were financially naïve and
too dependent on their mother.7

In Estate of Black, because the Tax Court held the
Blacks’ transfers fell within the bona fide sales exception of section 2036, they were successful at avoiding
the application of the provision. Thus, they were able
to obtain valuation discounts for their transfers of
property mostly marketable securities to their son and
grandchildren. The court also decided the marital trust
funding valuation date issue in the executor’s favor
and allowed almost half of the claimed administrative
expense deductions.

At about that same time, Mr. Black was anxious about
family discord among the children of one of the company’s founders, who as trustees controlled 76.2 percent
of Erie’s voting stock. Also, the husband of one of those
children had an affair with a senior Erie officer, which
created further business disruptions.8 Mr. Black wished
‘‘to consolidate and retain the family’s Erie stock’’ in
order to have the Black family stock, representing 13-14
percent of the total Erie stock, constitute ‘‘the swing vote
in favor of the Hirt camp against the Hagen camp.’’9
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Mr. Black’s estate planners and tax advisers recommended a family limited partnership (FLP) to unite and
protect the Erie stock and to minimize estate taxes.

For most of his life Samuel Black Jr. worked for Erie
Indemnity Co., and according to its founder, he was
responsible for much of the insurance company’s success.1 During those years, Mr. Black acquired Erie stock
and became its second largest shareholder. His investment philosophy was characterized by a ‘‘buy and hold’’
attitude.2 When Mr. Black retired from Erie, he opened
his own insurance company, an independent agent of
Erie. In 1992 Mr. Black retired from managing his company but remained active in the business for the next nine
years.3 He died December 12, 2001, at age 99.4
Mrs. Black, to whom Mr. Black had been married for
69 years, died on May 25, 2002. They had one son (the
petitioner), who served as executor of his father’s estate,
and two adult grandsons.5 Before 1998 Mr. Black gave his
son both voting and nonvoting Erie stock. In 1988, with
his son as trustee, Mr. Black established for each grandson a trust funded with Erie nonvoting stock. Over the
next few years, Mr. Black transferred Erie stock to his son
and to his grandsons’ trusts.6
Between 1988 and 1993, the Erie stock split several
times and appreciated significantly. With that increase,
Mr. Black feared that his son and grandchildren would

On October 12, 1993, Black LP was formed with Mr.
Black and his son (individually and as trustee of the
grandsons’ trusts) as partners. At that time, Mr. Black
was a healthy and active 91-year-old. He and his son
were the general partners, and they and the trusts were
limited partners in the FLP. Each made contributions to
the entity, and each received his proportionate interest in
exchange. Mr. Black was managing partner until 1998,
when he relinquished his 1 percent general partnership
interest to his son.10
Black LP retained all the Erie stock until after Mr.
Black’s death in 2001, and its net asset value increased
from approximately $80 million to more than $315 million.11 Besides Erie stock, the FLP invested in some real
estate and in shares of Mr. Black’s own insurance company.12 Between 1993 and 2001, Mr. Black made gifts to
his son, his grandsons, his grandsons’ trusts, and to
several private charities so that at his death, he owned a
77.0876 percent interest in Black LP.13 When Mr. Black
formed his FLP, he and Mrs. Black retained more than $4
million in assets and received income that ranged from

7

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
9
Id. at 11.
10
Id. at 12-15. The FLP held all of the Black family Erie stock,
except for 125,000 shares Mr. Black’s son had pledged as
collateral to the bank and except for 20 class B voting shares,
held half by Mr. Black and half by his son. Id. at 13.
11
Id. at 17-18.
12
Id. at 18.
13
Id. at 19.
8

1
Estate of Black v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 15 (2009), Doc
2009-27388, 2009 TNT 238-10.
2
Id. at 7.
3
Id. at 8.
4
Id. at 6.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 8. Before 1993 all of the stock owned by Mr. Black’s son
was the result of his father’s gifts.
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Id. at 22.
Id. at 19-21.
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Id. at 21-22. Mr. Black’s son disclaimed the entire $20
million bequest. Id. at 22.
17
Id. at 24.
18
Id. at 25 and 55.
15
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amount of $20,296,274. Mrs. Black’s estate deducted the
Erie reimbursement costs totaling $982,070, the son’s
executor/trustee fees of $1,155,000, and legal fees of
$1,155,000.19
The court first decided the section 2036 issue20 and
held that Mr. Black’s transfer of his Erie stock to Black LP
constituted a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration, the exception from the application of that statute.
Under Thompson,21 a taxpayer’s transfer of assets to an
FLP must be in good faith, which requires that the
taxpayer show a benefit in addition to the estate tax
valuation reduction.22 The court then analogized that
principle to its own criteria of a legitimate and significant
nontax reason under Bongard.23
The estate argued that Mr. Black’s transfer was motivated by a desire to:
• provide centralized long-term management and
protection of the Black family’s holdings in Erie
stock;
• preserve Mr. Black’s buy-and-hold investment philosophy for that stock;
• pool the family’s stock so it could be voted as a
block (thereby giving the family the swing vote in
the likely event of a split between the two H.O. Hirt
trust shareholders); and
• protect the Erie stock from creditors and divorce.24
The government contended that those purported
goals were unnecessary and insignificant factors for the
formation of Black LP. It also maintained that the FLP did
not have a functioning business and held only passive
assets, that Mr. Black did not play an important role in
forming the entity, and that he did not retain sufficient
funds to pay estate and inheritance taxes or fund the
charitable donation.25 The court dismissed the government’s last argument as irrelevant to the bona fide sales
exception, but only to the question whether Mr. Black
retained a section 2036 power or interest.26 The parties
also disagreed about the application of the Tax Court’s
Schutt27 decision to the facts in Black.
The court discussed the lengthy and loyal relationship
between Mr. Black and Erie. To underscore the particular
need for Mr. Black’s 1993 transfers, the court explained
that Mr. Black was then especially anxious about his son’s
marital difficulties and money complaints from the son’s
in-laws.28 In holding that Mr. Black created his FLP to

19

Id. at 25-29.
Preliminarily, the court held that the case was not decided
based on burden of proof. Id. at 29-30.
21
Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir.
2004), Doc 2002-22023, 2002 TNT 188-7. Appeal in Black, the
court noted, would be to the Third Circuit. Black, 133 T.C. No.
15, at 33.
22
Black, 133 T.C. No. 15, at 33-34.
23
Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95 (2005), Doc
2005-5359, 2005 TNT 50-11.
24
Id. at 35.
25
Id. at 37.
26
Id.
27
Estate of Schutt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-126, Doc
2005-11675, 2005 TNT 102-12.
28
Black, 133 T.C. No. 15, at 41.
20
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approximately $303,000 to $2.2 million annually, which
satisfied their personal expenses.14
Shortly before his death, Mr. Black transferred his FLP
interest to his revocable trust. According to the trust, Mr.
Black was the income beneficiary for his life, and at his
death the principal would pass according to his testamentary power of appointment, or, if he failed to appoint
anyone, as happened, it would pass as directed in the
original trust. At his death, Mr. Black’s revocable trust
created a marital trust benefiting his wife for her life,
with a remainder to the son and a residual trust for his
son.15 The amended trust provided, on his wife’s survival, for $20 million to go to his son; if he disclaimed any
of this bequest, the amount disclaimed would pass to a
charitable endowment established previously by his parents.16
Mrs. Black died soon after Mr. Black. There was not
enough time to fund the marital trust before her death,
and the trust remained unfunded because it terminated
at her death. As executor, their son made a qualified
terminable interest property election on Mr. Black’s estate
tax return to qualify the trust for the marital deduction.
On that return, as successor trustee of the revocable trust,
he stated that he had ‘‘intended to fund the marital trust
with a portion of the 77.0876-percent class B limited
partnership interest in Black LP that Mr. Black had
assigned to the revocable trust during his lifetime.’’17 The
parties stipulated and the court found that the value of
that interest as of Mr. Black’s death was $165,476,495.
Likewise, the parties stipulated that the value of a 1
percent class B limited partnership at that date was
$2,146,603, while at Mrs. Black’s death its value was
$2,469,728 ($2,281,124 on the elected alternate valuation
date).18
Although Mr. Black’s estate had sufficient cash assets
to pay its approximately $1.7 million estate tax liability,
Mrs. Black’s estate did not have enough assets to pay her
large administrative expenses and tax liabilities. Their
son, as executor, unsuccessfully tried to borrow money
from the bank and then from Erie. To deal with the
liquidity problem, the estate’s attorney suggested that
Erie participate in a secondary offering of about a third of
Black LP’s Erie stock. Erie assented on the condition that
the FLP agree to pay the expenses, including a $1.81
per-share underwriting discount amounting to approximately $98 million. Mr. Black’s son, as executor of his
mother’s estate, then entered into a loan agreement with
Black LP whereby the FLP agreed to lend her estate $71
million with interest and principal payable in full, but not
earlier than on November 30, 2007. In addition, Mrs.
Black’s estate agreed to reimburse the FLP for all expenses in connection with the secondary offering. The
FLP sold 3 million shares of Erie stock in a secondary
offering. The interest on the loan was deducted in the
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the court then considered the government’s position that
the widow’s legacy passed to her at her husband’s death
but rejected that contention because the terms of Mr.
Black’s revocable trust required a pecuniary amount not
in fact ascertainable until after the widow’s death. The
court thus held that because the deemed funding date
had to be a date after Mr. Black’s death, the deemed
funding for the marital trust, which was unfunded at
Mrs. Black’s death shortly after her husband’s, was
reasonably the date of the surviving spouse’s death.38
Moreover, because the revocable trust allowed the marital trust to be funded with cash, the Black LP interest
could have been sold and it would not make sense to
assume that more stock than required to satisfy the date
of distribution value would have been sold to satisfy that
value. The same result should be reached, therefore, with
a decision to fund the marital trust with assets in kind.39
Finally, the court reviewed the amount of several
section 2053 deductions taken by the estate. The court
held that because the $71 million loan from Black LP to
Mrs. Black’s estate and the revocable trust was unnecessary, the interest expense was not deductible under
section 2053(a)(2) to the estate:
The only distinction between the loan scenario and
the partial redemption scenario is that the former
gave rise to an immediate estate tax deduction for
interest in excess of $20 million. . . . That the loan
scenario, like the partial redemption scenario, required a sale of Erie stock to discharge the debts of
Mrs. Black’s estate, i.e., that Erie stock was available
and actually used for that purpose, negates petitioner’s contention that the loan was needed to
solve a ‘‘liquidity dilemma.’’40
However, the court allowed almost half of several
other administrative expenses because only 49 percent of
the proceeds from the secondary offering were used by
Mrs. Black’s estate to satisfy its debts.41 The court held
that the fees paid in connection with the secondary
offering of Black LP’s Erie stock were deductible to the
extent of $481,000 of its reimbursement,42 $577,500 in
executor’s fees,43 and $577,500 in legal fees.44

Schutt
In Schutt, unlike Black,45 the government had the
burden of proving that section 2036 applied because it
was not raised as an issue in the estate’s deficiency
notice.46 According to the estate, the decedent’s nontax

38

Id. at 56-60.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 67-68.
41
Id. at 72-73.
42
Id. at 73.
43
Id. at 76.
44
Id. at 78.
45
‘‘We need not decide whether section 7491(a) applies to the
material factual issues in these consolidated cases because we
find that a preponderance of the evidence supports our resolution of each of those issues. Therefore, resolution of those issues
does not depend on which party bears the burden of proof.’’
Id. at 30
46
Schutt, T.C. Memo. 2005-126, at 58.
39
40

29

Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 45 and 47.
31
Id. at 47-48.
32
Id. at 48.
33
Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir.
2004), Doc 2004-17577, 2004 TNT 171-8.
34
Black, 133 T.C. No. 15, at 50-53.
35
Id. at 54.
36
Id. at 55.
37
Id. at 56.
30
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protect the Erie stock from creditors, the court emphasized that the son’s Erie stock would be at risk in a
divorce because it constituted the son’s principal asset.29
Moreover, the court held that Mr. Black was motivated to
transfer the Erie stock in his grandsons’ trusts to Black LP
because he worried that his grandsons, with their lack of
ambition and financial expertise, would sell their Erie
stock when the trusts terminated.30
Repeating its language from Schutt, the court concluded that the consolidated case provided ‘‘a set of
unique circumstances’’ that satisfied the Bongard test.31
The court held that the second requirement under Bongard was met when both parties stipulated that the
transferors received their proportionate FLP interests.32
The government had cited Thompson33 to require that
without an operating business, there is insufficient consideration for the valuation discounts the estate receives.
But the court rejected that interpretation of the Tax
Court’s criteria under Bongard, which it also considered
in line with the Third Circuit’s position. Moreover, the
court stated that the government had conceded the issue
of adequacy of consideration when it stipulated that the
transferors received their proportionate FLP interests.34
The dispute over the correct value of the marital
deduction was mooted by the court’s holding on the
section 2036 question.35 However, the novel aspect of
Black is the marital trust funding date issue in which the
court considered whether the funding date of a pecuniary marital trust with date of distribution values that was
in fact unfunded at the surviving spouse’s death should
be deemed funded at the date of the first spouse to die’s
death or at the date of the surviving spouse’s death. At
Mr. Black’s death, the value of the marital trust Black LP
1 percent class B interest was $2,146,603. At his widow’s
death approximately six months later, its value was
$2,469,728. Consequently, the earlier funding date would
require more units to fund the trust than if the later
funding date were used, so that if the date of Mrs. Black’s
death was the deemed funding date, the amount included in her estate under section 2044 would be less.36
The estate argued that because Mr. Black’s revocable
trust provided for termination at Mrs. Black’s death,
under Example 8 of reg. section 20.2044-1(e) and as a
matter of logic, the marital trust should be deemed
funded at her later date of death. The government
maintained that the regulation was immaterial and that
because Mrs. Black’s legacy passed to her at his death, the
earlier date was the applicable deemed funding date.37
To answer this question, the court first analyzed the
application of the section 2044 regulation and held that
the example in the regulation was inapposite. However,
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Thompson
In Thompson, after the partnership’s formation, there
was a minimal practical change in the decedent’s relationship to the assets he contributed to his FLP: ‘‘Other
than favorable estate tax treatment resulting from the
change in form, it is difficult to see what benefit could be
derived from holding an untraded portfolio of securities
in this family limited partnership with no ongoing business operations.’’49 Thompson provided neither a pooling
of assets, a change in investment strategy, nor a business
reason for the transfer. Thompson emphasized that the
transfer of liquid assets for illiquid ones, thereby reducing the value of those assets by 40 percent in the
decedent’s estate, in itself indicates a lack of consideration.50 The Third Circuit held that because the part-

47

Id. at 79.
Id. at 83-84.
49
Thompson, 382 F.3d 367 at 380.
50
Id. at 380-381. Citing Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749
(5th Cir. 1997), the Thompson court explained, ‘‘If assets are
transferred inter vivos in exchange for other assets of lesser
value, it seems reasonable to conclude there is no transfer for
‘adequate and full consideration’ because the decedent has not
replenished the estate with other assets of equal value.’’ Id. at
48

nership did not conduct an active business and the
valuation discount was the sole reason for converting
marketable assets into illiquid ones, there was no consideration for the decedent’s transfer of assets to the partnership.
Although the court concluded that a bona fide sale did
not require an arm’s-length transfer to an unrelated third
party, the court held that the sale must be in good faith.
In this context, the court explained, good faith means that
the transferor should expect some business benefit — and
not merely a reduction in his estate taxes — for the
transfer of his assets to a partnership. The court affirmed
the Tax Court essentially because, as it stated, ‘‘neither
the Thompson Partnership nor Turner Partnership conducted any legitimate business operations, nor provided
the decedent with any potential nontax benefit from the
transfers.’’51
The Third Circuit emphasized that the creation of an
FLP and the decedent’s late-in-life transfers to that entity
had an abuse potential:
Nonetheless, we believe this sort of dissipation of
value in the estate tax context should trigger
heightened scrutiny into the actual substance of the
transaction. Where, as here, the transferee partnership does not operate a legitimate business, and the
record demonstrates the valuation discount provides the sole benefit for converting liquid, marketable assets into illiquid partnership interests, there
is no transfer for consideration within the meaning
of section 2036(a).52
Citing Gregory v. Helvering,53 the Third Circuit stated:
Even when all the ‘‘i’s are dotted and t’s are
crossed,’’ a transaction motivated solely by tax
planning and with ‘‘no business or corporate purpose . . . is nothing more than a contrivance. To
hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality
and to deprive the statutory provision in question
of all serious purpose.’’54

Analysis and Conclusion
Does Black follow Schutt? Yes — although it is less
certain that the Third Circuit has in fact embraced the
Bongard test. However, the court in both Black and Schutt
underlined the uniqueness of the facts in each case as
providing an ‘‘unusual scenario’’ in which the FLP provided the limitations not currently available because of
the terms of the trusts. Yet categorizing a buy-and-hold
investment strategy as a significant nontax reason for
establishing an FLP is ironic. Like the decedent in Schutt,
Mr. Black wanted to retain control of the investment
decisions of his grandsons’ trusts, so he created an FLP

381, citing Wheeler, 116 F.3d 749 at 762. (‘‘Unless a transfer that
depletes the transferor’s estate is joined with a transfer that
augments the estate by a commensurate (monetary) amount,
there is no ‘adequate and full consideration’ for the purposes of
either the estate or gift tax.’’)
51
Id. at 383.
52
Id. at 381.
53
293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
54
Thompson, 382 F.3d 367 at 383. (Emphasis added.)

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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motive for forming Schutt I and II was to create an entity
to buy and hold investments according to the decedent’s
investment philosophy for DuPont and Exxon stock
owned by both the decedent and several trusts benefiting
his children and grandchildren. The FLPs’ purpose was
to supply centralized management and to avoid unwise
sales of the decedent’s family’s stock holdings in those
companies, especially because the trusts were due to
terminate at various times, with a resulting distribution
of trust assets. During the negotiations, there was little
indication of a tax or estate planning motive. The court
held that the government had not sustained its burden of
proof that estate tax savings were the principal reason for
creating the FLPs or that the estate’s assertion of a nontax
motive was disingenuous.
Schutt acknowledged that the Third Circuit in Thompson had found that when an FLP was established for the
sole purpose of holding marketable securities, it was
unlikely that the court would find a significant nontax
motive. However, in Schutt, the court listed factors indicating a nontax motive: There was an actual transfer of
the property to the FLPs, there was no commingling of
assets, the decedent had retained sufficient assets for his
support and the maintenance of his lifestyle, and the
decedent was not on both sides of the transaction.
Regarding that last point, the Schutt court explained that
there was sufficient evidence of give and take and the
trust’s representatives were very involved in the process:
‘‘Such a scenario bears the earmarks of considered negotiations, not blind accommodation. There is no prerequisite that arm’s-length bargaining be strictly adversarial or
acrimonious.’’47 The court underlined that in Schutt, in
which others contributed most of the property and the
decedent wanted to create an entity primarily to restrict
the sales of certain assets, there was not merely a recycling of the decedent’s holdings.48
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for that supposed nontax purpose. But isn’t that inherently a tax purpose since it is the equivalent to retaining
control of assets after transferring them to an irrevocable
trust? If the grandsons’ trusts had themselves provided
Mr. Black with a retained unrestricted power to impose
his own investment choices on the trusts, wouldn’t
section 2036(a)(2) have pulled the trust assets back into
Mr. Black’s estate?
Moreover, there are questions suggested by this line of
cases that should be addressed by Congress if not by the
courts. Does Black/Schutt produce a good result? Is Bongard an adequate test to distinguish between those limited partnerships that are created primarily to effect
transfer tax valuation discounts and those that would
have been established without such a heavy tax incentive? Aren’t these FLP discounts a clear example of
‘‘exalting artifice above reality?’’
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